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DISCRETION OR DISCRIMINATION: WHETHER THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
REQUIRES FATHERS AND MOTHERS TO BE TREATED 
EQUALLY IN SATISFYING THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE AND 
LEGITIMIZATION CLAUSE OF TITLE 8 U.S.C. § 1409 
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SECOND 
CIRCUIT 
Morales-Santana v. Lynch1 
(decided July 8, 2015) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
President Barack Obama believes immigration reform can be 
achieved lawfully through the courts.2  However, despite President 
Obama’s optimism, Congress has complete discretion in creating leg-
islation that excludes aliens from legally entering the country.3  Con-
gress also has the discretion to determine when and how unwed Unit-
ed States citizen parents can transfer citizenship to their foreign-born 
children.4  Generally, when a statute limits the rights of citizens on 
the basis of gender, Congress must demonstrate these distinctions do 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment.5  Thus, the distinctions made between fathers and moth-
ers will not violate the Equal Protection Clause if said distinctions are 
based on, and actually serve an important governmental objective.6  
 
1 804 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2015). 
2 John H. Adler, President ‘Frustrated’ with Court Decision on Immigration Reforms, 
THE WASHINGTON POST (Jun. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/06/08/president-frustrated-with-court-decision-on-immigration-
reforms/. 
3 Morales-Santana, 792 F.3d at 527 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)). 
4 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (1998). 
5 Ryan James & Jane Zara, Equal Protection, 3 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 15 (2002) [herein-
after Equal Protection]. 
6 Id. at 3-4. 
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For this reason, the Second Circuit in Morales-Santana v. Lynch7 cor-
rectly held that 8 U.S.C. section 1409 (a) was unconstitutional be-
cause, in comparison to a citizen mother, a citizen father should not 
be required to satisfy a longer physical presence requirement in the 
United States or its territories in order to transfer American citizen-
ship to his foreign-born child.8  Such a distinction does not serve an 
important governmental objective.9 
First, this Note will discuss the fundamental differences be-
tween the physical presence provision under review in Morales-
Santana and the legitimization provision under review in Nguyen v. 
INS.10  Drawing a distinction among the provisions will demonstrate 
that fathers and mothers are not similarly situated in their ability to 
satisfy the legitimization provision but are similarly situated in their 
ability to establish legitimization of a child under the physical pres-
ence provision.11  Second, this Note will analogize the reasoning in 
Morales-Santana to the New York Court of Appeals case in the Mat-
ter of Raquel Marie X12 to demonstrate that each provision within a 
statute cannot purport to serve an interest already addressed by other 
provisions nor impose burdens too attenuated to the governmental 
objectives.13 
II. MORALES-SANTANA V. LYNCH 
A. 8 U.S.C. § 1409 
Title 8 U.S.C. section 1409 governs how unmarried United 
States citizen parents can transfer American citizenship to their for-
 
7 804 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2015). 
8 Id. at 535. (“[F]or these reasons, the gender-based distinction at the heart of the 1952 
Act's physical presence requirements is not substantially related to the achievement of a 
permissible, non-stereotype-based objective.”).  See Villegas-Sarabia v. Johnson, No. 5:15-
CV-122-DAE, 2015 WL 4887462 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2015); see also Tuan Anh Nguyen v. 
I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001) (distinguishing Nguyen v. I.N.S. from Morales-Santana to 
hold that the legitimization clause of 8 U.S.C. section 1409 did not violate a father’s right to 
equal protection under the law). 
9 Id. 
10 See infra note 14 at 2. 
11 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 531. 
12 559 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y. 1990). 
13 Id. at 419. 
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eign-born children.14  However, fathers must satisfy different re-
quirements than mothers under section 1409.15 
First, fathers and mothers must satisfy the requirements of the 
physical presence provision.16  A citizen mother must be physically 
present in the United States for a continuous period of one year prior 
to the birth of the child.17  In contrast, a citizen father must be physi-
cally present in the United States for a continuous period of ten years 
prior to the birth of the child.18  In addition, five of those years must 
be completed after the father’s fourteenth birthday.19 
Second, fathers and mothers must also establish they are bio-
logically related to the foreign-born child.20  A mother satisfies this 
provision at the birth of the child.21  However, a father must satisfy 
the requirements of two provisions before the child reaches eighteen 
years of age: 1) establish paternity by clear and convincing evidence; 
and 2) agree in writing to economically support the child until the 
child reaches eighteen years of age.22 
Lastly, a father must satisfy the requirements of the legitimi-
zation provision.23  Only citizen fathers must satisfy this provision.24  
 
14 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1952). 
15 Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1952); see also 8 U.S.C § 1409(a) (1952). 
16 See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1952). 
17 Id. 
18 See Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 523; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1952) (emphasis add-
ed). 
19 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 523. 
20 Kristin Collins, When Fathers' Rights Are Mothers' Duties: The Failure of Equal Pro-
tection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669, 1698 (2000) (“In 1986, Congress increased 
the number of criteria for fathers of foreign-born non-marital children, requiring production 
of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of paternity, legitimation of the child before she turned 
eighteen, and a promise to support the child until she turned eighteen.”) [hereinafter Father’s 
Rights Are Mother’s Duties]. 
21 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1952) (omitting the paternity requirement and only mentioning the 
mother’s requirement for citizenship before the child’s birth and the physical presence re-
quirement). 
22 See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1-3) (1952) The provisions of paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (g) of 
section 1401 of this title, and of paragraph (2) of section 1408 of this title, shall apply as of 
the date of birth to a person born out of wedlock if (2) the father had the nationality of the 
United States at the time of the person's birth, (3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in 
writing to provide financial support for the person until the person reaches the age of 18 
years. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1) (1952) (“[A] blood relationship between the person 
and the father is established by clear and convincing evidence”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 
1409(a)(3) (1952). 
23 8 U.S.C § 1409(a)(4) (1952): 
[W]hile the person is under the age of 18 years--(A) the person is legiti-
mated under the law of the person's residence or domicile, (B) the father 
3
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A father must comply with one of the three statutory options in order 
to legitimize his child: 1) legitimize pursuant to the laws of the 
child’s residence or domicile; 2) acknowledge his paternity under 
oath; or 3) obtain adjudication of a court.25 
On its face, 8 U.S.C. section 1409 imposes greater restrictions 
on fathers in their desire to transfer citizenship to their foreign chil-
dren born out of wedlock.26  However, historically, Congress intend-
ed a father’s right to be limited.27  Proposed amendments to the 1952 
Immigration and Nationality Act demonstrated that Congress be-
lieved unwed fathers were not as connected to their illegitimate chil-
dren as mothers.28  In addition, Congress was suspicious of fathers 
who sought to establish paternity of their illegitimate children for the 
sole purpose of transferring citizenship.29 
However, recent Congressional reports have been more criti-
cal of the distinct criteria required of fathers and mothers under the 
physical presence provision.30  These reports have outlined the ineq-
uitable treatment of American citizens living abroad.31  Subsequent to 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Congress proposed to 
return to the simplistic requirements of 1790, when Congress first en-
countered the issue of foreign-born children of citizen parents.32  
However, since the codification of the 1986 Act in what is today rec-
ognized as 8 U.S.C section 1409, Congress has not changed the phys-
ical presence provision, despite recommendations from President Re-
 
acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or (C) the 
paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a competent 
court. 
Id. 
24 8 U.S.C § 1409(c) (1952). 
25 8 U.S.C § 1409(a)(4) (1952). 
26 Father’s Rights Are Mother’s Duties, supra note 20, at 1673 (arguing that it is evident 
mothers carry the greater responsibility for the child while fathers have a choice as to wheth-
er to care for the child). 
27 Oscar M. Trelles II & James F. Bailey III, Immigration Nationality Acts. Legislative 
Histories and Related  1950-1978 i 1950-1978 at 134 [hereinafter Legislative Histories]. 
28 Id. (“However, in the case of a child born out of wedlock, a family unity is normally 
maintained between the child and [his or her] natural mother but not necessarily between the 
child and [his or her] natural father.”). 
29 Id. 
30 Igor I. Kavass & Bernard D. Reams, Jr., The Immigration Act of 1990: A Legislative 
History of Pub. L. No. 101-649 43 (1997) [hereinafter The Immigration Act]. 
31 Id. at 330. 
32 Id. at 329. 
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gan and committee members.33 
B. Factual and Procedural History 
The defendant’s father, Jose Dolores Morales, was born in 
Puerto Rico on March 19, 1900 and became a United States citizen in 
1917 pursuant to the Jones Act.34  On February 27, 1919, just twenty 
days shy of his nineteenth birthday, the defendant’s father left his 
home and traveled to the Dominican Republic to work for the South 
Porto Rico Sugar Company.35  In 1962, the defendant was born out of 
wedlock in the Dominican Republic to his U.S. citizen father and 
Dominican mother.36  The defendant was subsequently legitimized 
when his father and Dominican mother married in 1970.37 
Prior to his father passing away in 1976, the defendant en-
tered the United States as a lawful permanent resident.38  In 2000, af-
ter being convicted of a felony, the government commenced removal 
proceedings.39  The defendant applied to withhold the removal on the 
basis that he derived American citizenship through his father pursu-
ant to the physical presence provision in 8 U.S.C. section 1409(c).40  
However, the defendant’s father was not present in Puerto Rico for a 
continuous period of ten years, where five of those years were before 
the age of fourteen.41  Therefore, the immigration judge denied the 
 
33 See Melissa Fernandez, Title 8 U.S.C. § 1409 of the United States Immigration and Na-
tionality Act-Children Born Out of Wedlock: Undermining Fathers' Rights and Perpetuating 
Gendered Parenthood in Citizenship Law, 54 FLA. L. REV. 949, 958 (2002) [hereinafter Un-
dermining Fathers’ Rights]; see also The Immigration Act, supra note 30, at 330. 
34 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 524; see Jones Act of Puerto Rico, codified in 8 U.S.C. § 
1402 (West 2015): 
All persons born in Puerto Rico on or after April 11, 1899, and prior to 
January 13, 1941, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, resid-
ing on January 13, 1941, in Puerto Rico or other territory over which the 
United States exercises rights of sovereignty and not citizens of the 
United States under any other Act, are declared to be citizens of the 
United States as of January 13, 1941. All persons born in Puerto Rico on 
or after January 13, 1941, and subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States, are citizens of the United States at birth. 
Id. 
35 Id. at 524. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 524. 
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 524; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1952). 
41 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 524; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1952). 
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application.42 
The defendant filed a motion to reopen his removal proceed-
ings on equal protection grounds and newly obtained evidence re-
garding his father.43  The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) de-
nied his motion.44  The defendant appealed to the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals arguing that since section 1409(c) only required a 
mother to be continually present in the United States or one of its ter-
ritories for a period of one year prior to the child’s birth, the statute as 
applied to the defendant’s father violated the defendant’s right to 
equal protection under the law.45  In other words, if the requirements 
for a mother to confer citizenship were applied to the facts of his 
case, the defendant would be eligible to derive citizenship.46 
C. The Second Circuit’s Reasoning 
In Morales-Santana, the court reviewed the physical presence 
requirement codified in 8 U.S.C. section 1409(a) and held that it vio-
lated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment guarantee of equal protection 
of the law.47  First, the court determined that intermediate scrutiny 
should be applied in the evaluation of the physical presence provision 
of the statute because fathers and mothers are treated differently 
based on gender.48  Under intermediate scrutiny, gender-based dis-
tinctions must serve important governmental objectives.49  Addition-
ally, those gender-based distinctions must substantially relate to the 
governmental objective.50 
The court reasoned that there was an important governmental 
interest in establishing the physical presence provision to ensure that 
a foreign-born child has significant ties to the state.51  However, the 
court rejected the government’s first assertion that the physical pres-
 
42 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 525. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 527; See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1952) (“[I]f the mother had the nationality of the 
United States at the time of such person's birth, and if the mother had previously been physi-
cally present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period 
of one year.”). 
46 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 527; see U.S.C § 1409(c) (1952). 
47 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 528. 
48 Id. 
49 Id.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 530. 
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ence provision in practice actually furthered the goal of ensuring a 
foreign-born child has ties to the United States.52  The government 
could not identify any persuasive reason justifying the distinction be-
tween fathers and mothers to satisfy the requirements of the physical 
presence provision.53 
The court distinguished the issues in Morales-Santana from 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Nguyen v. INS to fur-
ther reject the government’s claim that gender-based distinctions 
serve to ensure a foreign-born child has ties to the United States.54  In 
Nguyen, the Court identified two important governmental interests 
that gender distinctions served.55  The first interest concerned ensur-
ing the foreign-born child had sufficient ties to the citizen parent.56  
The second interest was guaranteeing the foreign-born child and citi-
zen father actually had a “real, meaningful relationship.”57 
Additionally, the court in Morales-Santana rejected the gov-
ernment’s second assertion that the physical presence provision 
served to legitimize the child because legitimization was not a point 
at issue in this case.58  The court determined that the legitimization 
provision under section 1409(a)(4) encompassed all the requisite tests 
to ensure that the child and father have the opportunity to foster a real 
relationship.59  Therefore, the court concluded that gender-based dis-
tinctions were not related to the government’s objective of ensuring 
that a foreign-born child to an unwed citizen father had sufficient ties 
to the United States.60 
Moreover, although the court acknowledged that the preven-
tion of statelessness is an important governmental interest, the gen-
der-based distinctions were not substantially related to that interest.61  
An example of statelessness is when “a child born out of wedlock . . . 
is born inside a country that does not confer citizenship based on 
place of birth and neither of the child’s parents conferred derivative 
 
52 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 530. 
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 531 (quoting Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65). 
58 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 531. 
59 Id.; see Father’s Rights Are Mother’s Duties, supra note 20. 
60 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 531. 
61 Id. 
7
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citizenship on him.”62  The court denied that Congress intended for 
the physical presence provision to address statelessness, much less 
address the need for gender-based distinctions.63 
To support the finding that gender-based distinctions were not 
substantially related to the prevention of statelessness, the court re-
viewed Congress’s purpose for establishing gender-based distinctions 
under the 1952 Act.64  In section 205 of the 1940 Act, Congress stat-
ed that both citizen fathers and married citizen mothers had to com-
ply with the ten-year physical presence provision.65  Nonetheless, 
unwed mothers could confer citizenship on their children if they 
maintained residence in the United States at any point before the 
child’s birth.66  The 1952 Act subsequently added another provision 
requiring unwed mothers to continuously reside in the United States 
for one-year prior to the birth of the child.67  However, upon review-
ing the Executive Branch’s explanatory comments and the congres-
sional hearings for the 1940 and 1952 Act, the court did not find sub-
stantial evidence that statelessness was ever a concern in establishing 
the physical presence provision.68 
Furthermore, the court determined that even if the physical 
presence provision was drafted for the prevention of statelessness, 
gender-based distinctions do not operate to prevent it.69 The court 
reasoned that where gender-neutral alternatives are available to fur-
ther governmental interests, no distinctions based on gender could 
survive intermediate scrutiny.70 
One example of a gender-neutral alternative can be found in 
1933 when Secretary of State Cordell Hull proposed to the Chairman 
of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, that both 
fathers and mothers should have the ability to equally transfer citi-
zenship to their foreign-born child if they are American and reside in 




64 Id. at 532. 




69 Id. at 534. 
70 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 534. 
71 Id. (“ ‘remov[ing] ... discrimination between’ mothers and fathers ‘with regard to  the 
transmission of citizenship to children born abroad.’ ”). 
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termined that the physical presence provision created a “minimal 
burden on unwed citizen fathers.”72  However, where the legitimiza-
tion provision could be satisfied by a father’s simple acknowledg-
ment of paternity under oath, the satisfaction of the physical presence 
provision unduly burdens fathers.73 
In finding that the gender-based distinctions in the physical 
presence requirement of 8 U.S.C section 1409(a) were not sufficient-
ly related to the governmental interests in establishing that a foreign-
born child has ties to the United States or avoiding statelessness, the 
court held that the provision violated the defendant’s right to equal 
protection of the law.74  Therefore, the court determined that the ap-
propriate remedy was to strike section 1409(a) for its unconstitution-
ality and extend section 1409(c) to unwed citizen fathers.75  Under 
section 1409(c), the Second Circuit determined that the defendant 
was a citizen of the United States at the time of his birth.76 
II. THE FEDERAL APPROACH 
A. The Fifth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution offers 
individuals the right to equal protection under the law.77  An individ-
ual, who is part of a distinct and recognizable class, may face a po-
tential Fifth Amendment violation if he or she is treated differently as 
a result of that membership under the written and applied law.78  
Congress cannot draft statutes that treat men and women who are 
“similarly situated” differently.79  An individual seeking to assert 
equal protection violations must prove that there are no actual differ-
ences that the government bases their treatment on.80 
 
72 Id. at 535. 
73 Id. (“It adds to the legitimation requirement ten years of physical presence in the United 
States, five of which must be after the age of fourteen. In our view, this burden on a citizen 
father’s right to confer citizenship on his foreign-born child is substantial.”). 
74 Id. 
75 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 537. 
76 Id. at 538. 
77 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law.”). 
78 United States v. Scott, 919 F. Supp. 2d. 423, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
79 See Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 531. 
80 See Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 3-5. 
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In the event Congress passes a law that treats individuals dif-
ferently as a result of their membership in a particular group, the 
court will apply strict scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, or rational basis 
review.81  For gender classifications, heightened scrutiny applies 
where the statute must both, “serve important governmental objec-
tives” and “be substantially related to those objectives.”82  The first-
prong of the heightened scrutiny test gives rise to the question: 
whether the governmental objective is important.83  However, gov-
ernmental objectives that further stereotypical gender roles are not 
considered “important” for equal protection purposes and do not sur-
vive heightened scrutiny, such as where men are considered the head 
of the household or women are considered homemakers.84 
The second prong of the test gives rise to the question: wheth-
er the gender classification is substantially related to the objectives 
sought.85  Even though the substantial relationship test is always con-
sidered, some courts will not inquire into it when considering wheth-
er men and women are similarly situated.86  Sometimes federal courts 
determine substantial relationship by using empirical data that shows 
that gender-based distinctions do in fact further the objective.87 
B. Nguyen v. INS 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Nguyen pro-
vides the key reasoning as to why fathers and mothers are similarly 
situated when it comes to the requirements of the physical presence 
provision under review in Morales-Santana, but are not similarly sit-
uated under the legitimatization provision.88  In Nguyen, the court re-
viewed the legitimization provision set forth in 8 U.S.C. section 
 
81 See id. at 5; see also id. at 5-6. Strict scrutiny applies to classifications based on race or 
national origin. Id. at 14. A law is upheld under strict scrutiny if the classification serves a 
compelling governmental interest that is narrowly tailored to further that interest.  Id. at 6.  
Rational basis review applies to classifications not affecting race or gender. Equal Protec-
tion, supra note 5, at 10. A law is upheld under rational basis review if a legitimate govern-
mental interest is rationally related to the classification.  Id. 
82 Id. at 9. 
83 Id. 
84 See Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 9; see also id. at 15-16. 
85 See id. at 18. 
86 See id. at 17. 
87 See id. at 18. 
88 See Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 531. 
10
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1409(a)(4)(A-C).89  Only citizen fathers are required to satisfy the le-
gitimization provision by one of the three statutory options: 1) pursu-
ant to the laws of the child’s residence or domicile; 2) acknowledging 
his paternity under oath; or 3) an adjudication of a court.90 
In this case, the defendant was born out of wedlock in Vi-
etnam to an American father and a Vietnamese mother, and was at-
tempting to derive citizenship from his father.91  The defendant be-
came a lawful permanent resident of the United States at the age of 
six.92  However, at the age of twenty-two, the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (“INS”) initiated deportation proceedings against 
the defendant after he pleaded guilty on two counts of sexual as-
sault.93  Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. section 1409, the defendant’s father did 
not satisfy the requirements to transfer citizenship to the defendant, 
since the father obtained an order of paternity when the defendant 
was 28 years old.94  However, the Court held that 8 U.S.C. section 
1409 did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.95 
Justice Kennedy made three points as to why fathers and 
mothers are not similarly situated under the legitimization provi-
sion.96  First, a mother, as opposed to a father, can choose to give 
birth to a child on United States soil.97  Therefore, a mother’s choice 
to transfer citizenship should simply be an extension of her innate 
right.98 Second, the legitimization provision is flexible because a fa-
 
89 8 U.S.C §1409(a)(4)(A-C) (1952). 
90 8 U.S.C §1409(a)(4) (1952). 
91 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 57-58; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1952): 
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial 
support for the person until the person reaches the age of 18 years, and 
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years—(a) the person is legit-
imated under the law of the person's residence or domicile, (b) the father 
acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or (c) the pa-
ternity of the person is established by adjudication of a competent court. 
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57-58. 
95 Id. at 73. 
96 Id. at 61. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  It is important to note that a mother’s preferred status does not guarantee her a less 
restrictive physical presence requirement.  See Brief for Petitioner at 5, Nguyen v. I.N.S., 
533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No.99-2071). 
State laws regarding out-of-wedlock fathers' parental status have 
11
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ther can perform any of the three statutory acts before the child 
reaches eighteen years of age.99 
As to Justice Kennedy’s third point, the gender-based distinc-
tions in the legitimization provisions serve to ensure that the foreign-
born child and the father had an opportunity to develop a true connec-
tion based on day-to-day interactions.100  These interactions will in 
turn secure that the foreign-born child sustains sufficient connections 
to the United States.101  The Court based its reasoning on the fact that 
mothers and fathers establish paternity to their child at different 
times.102  As a result, a father must demonstrate by legitimization that 
he has maintained a connection to the child.103  Fathers, by the pro-
cess of legitimization, can also ensure that the child has a connection 
to the United States.104  Moreover, the Court justified the legitimiza-
tion provision due to the concern that fathers could conceive children 
all over the world and never establish ties with them.105  Without first 
establishing that the father and foreign-born child have ties to each 
other, the foreign-born child cannot develop sufficient ties to the 
United States.106 
The first two points that Justice Kennedy presented provide 
some evidence as to why men and women are similarly situated in 
terms of the physical presence provision, but not in the legitimization 
provision.107 The physical presence provision stems from Congres-
sional action and is not an innate right of the mother.108 Further, the 
physical presence provision can only be satisfied prior to the birth of 
the child.109  To this end, the physical presence provision is more 
 
changed dramatically in the past six decades. The decided trend has been 
to recognize the importance of fathers' responsibilities to their non-
marital children, and to develop laws that ensure that children receive the 
benefits of parentage from their fathers rather than leaving it up to the fa-
ther to take affirmative actions to establish his legal responsibility. 
Id. 
99 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68-69; see 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1952). 
100 Nguyen, 533 U.S at 64. 
101 Id. at 66-67. 
102 Id. at 66. 
103 Id. at 66. 
104 Id. at 68. 
105 Nguyen, 533 U.S at 66. 
106 Id. at 68-69. 
107 Id. at 62. 
108 Immigration Act, supra note 30, at 9. 
109 8 U.S.C § 1409 (1952). 
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burdensome to the father in comparison to the legitimization provi-
sion, since compliance rests on a narrow set of occurrences.110 
Additionally, both provisions provide stronger evidence that 
men and women are similarly situated with regard to the physical 
presence provision because the legitimization provision ensures that a 
biological parent-child relationship exists.111  Mothers establish bio-
logical ties to the child at birth.112  A father, on the other hand, does 
not establish paternity without DNA testing.113  However, even if the 
father establishes biological paternity, he does not establish ties to the 
child through paternity.114 The Court determined that a father may be 
biologically connected to the child but legitimization is still necessary 
to establish a father has sufficient ties to the child.115  Therefore, if 
the life of a parent is viewed on a timeline, issues affecting how a fa-
ther connects to the child and establishes paternity arise when the 
child is born, not before.116 
Further, the legitimization provision addresses post-birth con-
cerns by responding to the fundamental differences between men and 
women.117  In contrast, satisfaction of the physical presence provision 
is dependent on events that occur pre-birth of the child.118  Pre-birth, 
neither unmarried mothers nor unmarried fathers are affected by their 
connection with the child, and therefore the physical presence provi-
sion is unresponsive to the governmental concern. 119 
 
110 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d. at 535. 
And unlike the legitimation requirement at issue in Nguyen, which could 
be satisfied by, for example, ‘a written acknowledgment of paternity un-
der oath,’ the physical presence requirement that Morales–Santana chal-
lenges imposes more than a ‘minimal’ burden on unwed citizen fathers. 
It adds to the legitimation requirement ten years of physical presence in 
the United States, five of which must be after the age of fourteen. 
Id. 
111 Id. at 62. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d. at 63. 
115 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979)) 
(“The validity of the father’s parental claims must be gauged by other measures.”). 
116 Id. at 66. 
117 Id. at 69. 
118 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d. at 531 (“But unwed mothers and fathers are similarly sit-
uated with respect to how long they should be present in the United States or an outlying 
possession prior to the child's birth in order to have assimilated citizenship-related values to 
transmit to the child.”). 
119 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1993) (holding “ ‘[i]nherent differ-
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The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution offers 
individuals who are part of a distinct and recognizable class equal 
protection of the law.120  A statute or regulation is unconstitutional 
when an individual is treated differently as a result of that member-
ship.121  All laws that treat men and women who are similarly situated 
differently face intermediate scrutiny.122  This means that the gender-
based distinction must serve important governmental objectives and 
be substantially related to those objectives.123  The court in Nguyen 
outlined how the legitimization provision addressed the important 
governmental objective that unwed citizen fathers establish ties to 
their children and the importance that a child develop ties to the Unit-
ed States by way of that connection.124  However, the holding in Ngu-
yen highlighted that the legitimization provision, not the physical 
presence provision, addressed the concerns of a parent bonding with 
the foreign-born child or establishing that the foreign-born child had 
sufficient ties to the United States.125 The legitimization provision 
addressed postpartum concerns by making postpartum demands on 
the father.126  The physical presence provision makes pre-birth de-
mands that are unresponsive to the governmental interests and, there-
fore, deny United States citizen fathers equal protection of the law.127 
III. THE NEW YORK STATE APPROACH 
A. The New York State Constitution and Equal 
Protection 
Article 1, section 11 of the New York State Constitution pro-
vides that no person should be deprived of equal protection under the 
 
ences’ between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, 
but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an indi-
vidual's opportunity.”). 
120 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
121 United States v. Scott, 919 F. Supp. 2d. 423, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
122 See Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 5. 
123 See id. at 9. 
124 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65. 
125 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d. at 531. 
126 8 U.S.C § 1409 (1952). 
127 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d. at 538. 
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laws of the state.128  Similar to the intermediate heightened scrutiny 
test applied for gender-based distinctions under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the federal constitution, a state statute must further a “pow-
erful countervailing State interest” and there must be a close connec-
tion between the means used and the governmental objective sought 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the New York State Constitu-
tion.129 
B. In the Matter of Raquel Marie X 
The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the constitutionali-
ty of a gender-based distinction in an adoption statute, Domestic Re-
lations Law (“DRL”) section 111(1).130  The statute required an un-
wed mother’s consent before placing a less than six-month-old child 
for adoption.131  However, an unwed father had to live with the child 
or the mother for six continuous months for his consent to be required 
before placing a child for adoption.132  This statute was examined un-
der the similar facts of two distinct adoption proceedings involving 
children born out-of-wedlock. 133 
In the first case, Baby Girl S was born to Regina on April 24, 
1988.134  On April 27, 1988, Regina placed Baby Girl S for adop-
tion.135  Regina and Baby Girl S’s father, Gustavo, did not live to-
gether before the child was placed up for adoption for the relevant 
six-month period.136  Regina and Gustavo were estranged during this 
period.137  However, following the adoption, Gustavo and Regina 
 
128 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 (McKinney 2015) (“No person shall be denied the equal pro-
tection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof.”). 
129 Matter of Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 425 (1990): 
Where a fundamental interest of this nature is at issue, any legislation 
limiting or burdening it at the very least must meet two tests: the statute 
must further a powerful countervailing State interest, and there must be a 
close fit between the governmental objective sought and the means cho-
sen to achieve it. 
Id. 
130 Id. at 419. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 419.  
134 Id. at 420. 
135 Id. at 419-20. 
136 Id. at 420. 
137 Id. 
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reconciled and Regina supported Gustavo’s efforts to gain custody of 
Baby Girl S.138 
After Gustavo applied for custody, the New York Surrogate’s 
Court denied the prospective adoptive parents’ petition to adopt Baby 
Girl S, holding that the adoptive parents’ fraudulent conduct139 pre-
vented Gustavo from knowing of Regina’s pregnancy or his paterni-
ty.140  On appeal, the Appellate Division for the First Department 
found that the conduct made Gustavo’s efforts to comply with the 
statute impossible.141  It affirmed the Surrogate’s Court’s decision 
and rejected the adoption of Baby Girl S.142  The court ordered the 
transfer of Baby Girl S from the prospective adoptive parents to Gus-
tavo.143  However, the prospective adoptive parents were granted the 
motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York.144 
In the second case, Raquel Marie was born to Louis on May 
26, 1988.145  Similar to the first case, Louis was estranged from 
Raquel Marie’s father, Miguel, when Raquel Marie was placed in 
adoption proceedings on July 22, 1988.146  However, on November 4, 
1988, Louis and Miguel married.147  At that time, Raquel Marie was 
adopted when she was just a few days old and living in New Hamp-
shire with her adoptive parents.148  After his marriage to Louis, Mi-
guel sought custody of Raquel Marie.149 
The trial court ruled, pursuant to DRL section 111(1)(e), that 
Miguel and Louis had a continuous relationship that satisfied the “liv-
ing together” provision of the statute.150  However, the Appellate Di-
vision for the Second Department reversed, finding that Miguel did 
not satisfy the “living together” provision or the remaining require-
ments set forth in the statute.151  Miguel appealed the Appellate Divi-
 
138 Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 420. Baby Girl S was adopted prior to Gustavo’s filing 




142 Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 420. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 420. 
146 Id. 
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sion’s decision.152 
The New York Court of Appeals granted the appeals in both 
Baby Girl S and Raquel Marie’s case.153  The issue raised on appeal 
was whether the provision requiring a father to live with the mother 
continuously for six months immediately preceding the adoption ren-
ders the statute unconstitutional.154  The court provided the judicial 
history of unwed fathers’ rights concerning the adoption of their chil-
dren.155 
Prior to 1970, an unwed father did not have legal rights to his 
children.156  Upon the death of the child’s mother, the child became a 
ward of the state.157  In  Stanley v. Illinois,158 the United States Su-
preme Court established that if the father raised and was biologically 
connected to the child, he had legal rights to the child.159  Thereafter, 
in the 1976 DRL 111(a), the New York legislature acknowledged that 
fathers had the right to notice of adoption proceedings where they 
could present evidence of what was in the “best interest of the 
child.”160  However, at this time, the father did not yet have vetoing 
rights to the adoption.161 
In 1978, although the United State Supreme Court determined 
in Quilloin v. Walcott162 that an unwed father’s equal protection chal-
lenge to New York DRL section 111 could only be sustained when a 
father takes responsibility for that child, the statute was held uncon-
stitutional as applied to fathers one year later.163  In Caban v. Mo-
 
While the court explicitly premised its holding on Miguel’s failure to 
meet the ‘living together’ requirement, it additionally observed that there 
was little evidence of Miguel’s compliance with the remaining two re-
quirements of Domestic Relations Law § 111(1)(e), or of any effort on 
his part to manifest substantial parental responsibility.  
Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 420. 
152 Id. at 420. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 421. 
156 Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 421. 
157 Id. 
158 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
159 Id. at 651. 
160 Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 421. 
161 Id. 
162 435 U.S. 246 (1978). 
163 Id. at 256; Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 422. 
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hammed,164 the Court reasoned that fathers who had custody of their 
children were on equal footing with mothers in terms of caring for the 
child, and therefore, should be afforded the same opportunity to veto 
an adoption.165 
As a result, the New York legislature revised DRL section 
111 to comport with the holding in Caban, granting a father veto 
rights where he “objectively and unambiguously manifested that, 
through his efforts, there was a substantial, continuous, meaningful 
family relationship available to the child.”166  The New York legisla-
ture also proposed a distinct test to determine whether a father had es-
tablished a relationship with his biological children less than 6 
months of age and/or children over 6 months of age.167  Where a child 
is over 6 months of age, the father must have communicated with the 
child, financially supported, and visited the child to have the right to 
veto an adoption.168  The test for a child under 6 months old requires 
an unwed father to live with the child or the mother for six continu-
ous months before the child is placed in adoption proceedings.169 
As a result of the legislative and judicial history of the DRL 
and an unwed father’s right to veto adoptions, the court recognized 
several important state objectives.170  The first state objective is the 
protection of a father’s legal rights to his children, provided the father 
is biologically connected to the child and assumes parental responsi-
bility for the child.171  The second state objective is the protection of a 
child’s well-being and stability.172  The last state objective is the im-
portance of maintaining the integrity of the adoption system.173 
However, despite the legislative history, the Court of Appeals 
reasoned that the “living together” provision did not further the state 
interest of protecting a father’s legal right to his child when the father 
assumes responsibility of the child.174  First, the “living together” 
provision in practice serves as a barrier for unwed fathers to deny the 
 
164 441 U.S. 380 (1978). 
165 Id. at 396. 
166 Id.; Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 422. 
167 Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 423. 
168 Id. at 423. 
169 Id. at 425. 
170 Id. at 424. 
171 Id. 
172 Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 424. 
173 Id. at 425. 
174 Id. at 426. 
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adoption of his children. 175  Specifically, to satisfy section 111(1), a 
father must either live with the child or the mother for a continuous 
period of six months prior to the child’s placement in adoption pro-
ceedings.176  This means that a father could only satisfy this provision 
by living with the mother prior to the child’s birth and for most of the 
child’s life.177 
It is improbable that an issue of consent would arise where the 
father lived with the mother right before the child is put up for adop-
tion.178  The court determined that if a father both “openly acknowl-
edged his paternity during such period and paid reasonable pregnancy 
and birth expenses,”179 this was sufficient to prove that the father had 
taken care of the child and had a biological nexus.180  Thus, the “liv-
ing together” provision does not ensure a father has shouldered re-
sponsibility for the child in comparison to the acknowledgment and 
birth expenses provisions.181  Additionally, the court held that the 
“living together” provision does not further the state interest of 
providing a stable two-parent home for the child since single parent 
adoption is acceptable.182 
Lastly, the court rejected the argument that the “living togeth-
er” provision furthers the state interest of preserving the integrity of 
the adoption system.183  The integrity of the adoption system is pre-
served by the fact that fathers that veto adoption must also be willing 
to take custody of the child.184  Therefore, the court held that the “liv-
ing together” provision was unconstitutional because it did not fur-
ther any important state interest.185 
In the case of Baby Girl S, the father was granted custody be-
cause he consistently sought to assume responsibility for the child 
once he was made aware of her existence.186  In the case of Raquel 
Marie, the court reversed and remitted the case for further proceed-
 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 426. 
177 Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 426. 




182 Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 427. 
183 Id. at 428. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 427. 
186 Id. at 428. 
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ings on the issue of the father’s compliance with the birth and preg-
nancy expenses of the mother.187 
IV. FEDERAL AND STATE APPROACH COMPARISON 
The United States and New York State Constitutions each 
contain an Equal Protection Clause.188  Both Equal Protection Clauses 
implement intermediate “heightened scrutiny” to evaluate if the gen-
der classifications violate an individual’s right to equal protection of 
the law.189  The tests seek to find the nexus between the preservation 
of the important governmental interest and the means to preserve the 
interest.190 
Just as there are similarities between the federal and New 
York State Constitutions, there are also similarities between the New 
York DRL section 111(1) and 8 U.S.C. section 1409.  First, accord-
ing to section 111(1), a father must satisfy more requirements than a 
mother to gain veto rights when a child is placed in adoption proceed-
ings.191  As in the federal statute, burdens imposed by the state statute 
are based on gender classifications.192  Second, the criteria for a fa-
ther to gain adoption veto rights arise from a specific point in time of 
the father-child relationship, which is similar to the federal statute 
where a father has to comply with the physical presence requirement 
prior to the child’s birth.193  Lastly, the physical presence provision in 
Morales-Santana focuses on the activity of the father pre-birth, while 
section 111(1) also focuses on the father’s activity pre-birth as well 
as post-birth.194 
 
187 Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 428. 
188 See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 (McKinney 2015) (“No person shall be denied the equal 
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof.”); see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. V (“…nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law). 
189 See Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 425. 
Where a fundamental interest of this nature is at issue, any legislation 
limiting or burdening it at the very least must meet two tests: the statute 
must further a powerful countervailing State interest, and there must be a 
close fit between the governmental objective sought and the means cho-
sen to achieve it. 
Id. See also Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 15. 
190 Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 425.  
191 Id. at 419. 
192 8 U.S.C § 1409 (1952); see Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 419. 
193 Raquel Marie X.,559 N.E.2d at 419; see 8 U.S.C § 1409 (1952). 
194 Id.  
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Furthermore, the interests that New York State seeks to fur-
ther with the gender-based distinction in section 111(1) is similar to 
that of the federal government’s interest in Morales-Santana.  In 
Raquel Marie X, New York State had a legitimate state interest in en-
suring that the father had more than a biological connection to a child 
less than six months of age, before having the right to object to the 
adoption.195  The New York Court of Appeals emphasized fathers’ 
having a constitutional right to be afforded the opportunity to connect 
with the child.196  Like the Second Circuit, New York State courts try 
to balance the governmental interest with the gender-based distinc-
tion.197  In this case, protecting a father’s opportunity to connect with 
the infant and ensuring a father earned his vetoing rights were not in 
accord with creating more limitations on the father.198 
Both the New York Court of Appeals and Second Circuit 
proved that the gender-based distinctions did not further the objec-
tives sought by the government based on two facts.199  First, the New 
York Court of Appeals detailed how the “living together” provision 
continued to impede fathers from exercising vetoing rights despite 
publically acknowledging paternity and paying for reasonable birth 
and pregnancy expenses of a child under six months old.200  The Sec-
ond Circuit in Morales-Santana similarly identified how the require-
ments of the legitimization provision satisfied the government’s con-
cerns with fathers establishing ties to their foreign-born children, by 
accepting paternity under oath, adjudication by competent court, or 
under the laws of the foreign-born child’s domicile or residence.201 
Second, the New York Court of Appeals questioned the effec-
tiveness of the provision in ensuring that a father takes responsibility 
for a child by measuring the amount of time the father spent with the 
mother prior to the child’s birth.202  Even though the Second Circuit 
does not explicitly inquire into the effectiveness of the physical pres-
ence provision in accomplishing the task of ensuring the child has 
ties to the father, and in turn the state, the court did distinguish it 
 
195 Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 424. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 426. 
198 Id.  
199 Id. at 426; see Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 531. 
200 Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 426. 
201 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d. at 531. 
202 Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 426. 
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from the legitimization provision.203  From this comparison, it can be 
inferred that a child’s ties to the father should not hinge on factors 
that could never affect governmental interests.204  In the same way, 
measuring the amount of time a father spends with a mother prior to a 
child’s birth cannot ensure the father connected with the child post-
birth.  Furthermore, a father living in the state longer than a mother 
should not increase the likelihood a foreign-born child will have ties 
to the father once born.205 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit in Morales-Santana appropriately held 
that the physical presence provision as applied to fathers was uncon-
stitutional under federal application.206  The physical presence provi-
sion under review in Morales-Santana and the legitimization provi-
sion under review in Nguyen demonstrated the fundamental 
differences between the provisions in that fathers and mothers are not 
similarly situated in their ability to satisfy the legitimization provi-
sion but are similarly situated in their ability to satisfy the physical 
presence provision.207  Similar to the federal approach, the New York 
State approach to equal protection in Raquel Marie X emphasized 
that a provision that creates a gender-based distinction can never 
serve an important state interest, where another provision in the stat-
ute addresses the interest.208  Further, any governmental or state inter-
est cannot relate to the gender classification, where the interest does 






203 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d. at 531. 
204 Id. 
205 See id. at 531; see also Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 426. 
206 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d. at 538. 
207 Id. at 531. 
208 Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 426. 
209 Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d. at 531. 
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